REMARKS TO AIR FORCE CADETS

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Why need for clearly defined missions? Outputs

Basis for <u>all</u> planning decisions at all levels

- Just as director of academics at USAF Academy must understand what you will be expected to do/know (output) in order to design proper educational program (input).
 - So C of S of Air Force must know what the USAF is expected to do (output) in order to build/train forces, buy equipment and develop tactics, (inputs):
 - The <u>output</u> is really just the mission. Mission of the USAF Academy/

History of Naval Missions - very briefly -

Evolved over time.

Sea Control

٠.

o Trade increased

Protection/Denial of Trade - Blockade

2 • Today: Sortie/Choke Pt/Local Engagement/Open area ops Sea Control Tactics Note - Triple threat - air - surface - sub

Projection of Power - 19th C development

3 Sea Control Chart

SLIDES

井 7 Chart for

TacAir

rojection Tactics

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 assault)

(French Revolutionary Wars)

• TacAir - post WW II

Possible as a/c and munitions improved

Today: Amphibious Assault

Naval Bombardment

TacAir

5

Fleets

Presence - 19th Century - Gunboat Diplomacy

- Preventive Deployment
- Reactive Deployment

Strategic Deterrence

New mission

Generally exclusive of other missions

(special/dedicated forces: Polaris/Poseidon/Trident)

SLIDE

Strategic

Assured Second Strike

Controlled Response

Deter Third Powers

Balance of power image

Summary - 4 missions - interrelated

11 Summary 4 missions interrelated

Transition to Air Force Missions

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Missions change as world situation/national goals change.

- Can see how naval missions developed and emphasis changed.
- True of Air Force missions also? Let's look -
- Can any comparisons be made between USN and USAF missions?

 Let's take them separately.

(OPEN DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT TO INCLUDE CADETS)

Air Force Comparisons

SLIDE

9 USAF missions Here's statement of Air Force Mission. It talks about many of the same things I've just discussed with relation to naval mission.

5

SLIDES

9 USAF *** Missions

11 USN Strategic Deterrence

Strategic - Where Air Force fit it?

Start w/B-52 - which purpose?
 Controlled response - Yes

Deter 3rd powers - Yes

Balance of power - ?

Minuteman

2nd strike - Yes

Controlled response - ?

Command data buffer

Conflict with appearing to have 1st strike

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 Polaris/Poseidon

Best for assured 2nd

Controlled - ?

Accuracy

Range vs Security

Communications

• TRIAD

Sea Control

USN Sea Control

Sea Control Chart

• Sortie Contributions

Mining

B-52? C-5A?

Air Attacks on bases -

B-52 - ?

Choke Point

Subs

Mining

Air

Air interceptors rent i en en en en de la fait de la Parliere de America de La Sala de La Sala de La Sala de La Sala de 1900, s La Computação de la Compu COMBANT DE COMPUTA DE LA COMPUTA DE LA COMPUTAÇÃO DE LA COMPUTAÇÃO DE LA COMPUTAÇÃO DE LA COMPUTAÇÃO DE LA COMP

Anti-Ship

Attack aircraft

Alternative uses

Base loading/availability

🧿 Open Area 🦠

Recco - air - satellite

Anti-Ship

P-3 type capability?

Local Engagement

Inteceptors

Projection of Power Ashore

SLIDE

10 acAir Tactics

7 |acAir Chart ' Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4

• Tac Air

Deep Interdiction

Where one better other?

Security of bases

Ships - sea control

Land - mortars -

overrun -

geography,

long approach

Battlefield/CAS

Need for bases -

Navy quick response

AF - C-5A/mobility/bare base kits

9

SLIDES

_# 9 USAF Missions

4 USN Presence

Presence

- How can Air Force perform?
 - 1. Okinawa, Japan, Taiwan, Europe

Advantages -

Commitment

Permanent -

Ready

- 2. C-5A Air movement in exercises/demonstrations
- 3. Rescue/humanitarian operations

Conclusion

These are questions you must ask self when evaluating what the Air Force should be prepared to do.

You must begin now to question the rationale for your Service's mission. We are trying to do this in the USN.

9 Air Force Missions

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 Don't assume missions remain relevant over time.

- Be skeptical of traditional rationale and hackneyed phases, e.g., aerospace power - does it support the goals of a special interest group more than national goals - or mere Madison Ave. salesmanship?
- Is there a better way of doing what you are doing? With commitments all over the world, limited resources, an unsympathetic public (generall the case in peacetime).
 - Priorities must be established so \$ spent wisely.
 - Inter-service cooperation encouraged.
 - Gold plating ended (lo mix).

11

You can make a <u>real</u> contribution to your service and the nation now by:

developing a skeptical, inquisitive mind (ask "why" a lot;
 question rationale, motives, etc.)

don't accept things because they've always been that way

Speak out

Study, analyze, criticize, recommend.

Write articles -

Express your ideas.

You'd be surprised who'll publish them (Naval Institute, War College Review)

Above all, THINK about the big issues of national defense

for they influence everything else in the military. Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 NAVAL MISSIONS

USAF ACADEMY CATETS


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	Se	a Control	
1	(Salamis)		
2	(Tactics)	3	(Chart)
	Pro	jection of Power	
6	(Tactics)	7	(TacAir Chart)
	•	Presence	
4	(Tactics)	5	(Fleets)
	Stra	tegic Deterrence	
8	(Tactics)		
	Mis	sion Summary	
11	(Missions interrelated)		
in many many chairs placed speak throat	Àir Fo	rce Comparisons	
9	(USAF Missions)		
9	(USAF Missions)	. 11	(Strategic Deterrence)
2	(Sea Control Tactics)	3	(Sea Control Chart)
10	(TacAir Tactics)	7	(TacAir Chart)
9	(USAF Missions)	4	(Presence Tactics)
9	Approved For Release 2005/11 (USAF Missions)	/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R00370001	0001-4

Back up Slides:

- 12 A/C & Weapon Characteristics
- 13 Army Missions
- 14 Assertion/Denial Sea Control
- 15 Weapon Systems Applicable to Sea
- 16 Comparison of Amphibious Task Organization








PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE

- Amphibious Assault
 - MAF
 - MAB
 - MAU
 - Raid
- Naval Bombardment
- Direct
 Indirect

 - Tactical Air
 - Deep Interdiction
 - Battlefield Interdiction
 - Close Air Support
 - Counter-Air/Anti-Air






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Assured Second Strike
Controlled Response
Deter Third Powers
Balance Of Power Image

STRATEGIC:



MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

TO PROVIDE AEROSPACE FORCES FOR DETERRENCE OF WAR THROUGH READINESS TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO ANY LEVEL OF AGGRESSION, FROM GENERAL WAR TO LIMITED WAR AND INSURGENCY ACTIVITY.

- 1. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
- 2: AREA AIR SUPERIORITY
- 3. COMBAT SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES
- 4: RECONNAISSANCE
- 5. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FOR THE ARMED

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AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR

TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION MISSIONS

(H-HIGH; M-MEDIUM; L-LOW)

	DEEP INTERDICTION	BATTLEFIELD	CLOSE AIR	COUNTERAIR
AIRCRAFT	They (ure)	RESIDENCE TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH		
SPEED	A H COL	III M IN THE		Han H
MANEUVERABILITY	11550HJ515	Marin (A	H	THE SHARES
RANGE	H	M	H L II	M
ALL WEATHER	H			N N
SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS		M. M. M.	M	
DELIVERY SYSTEM CAPABILITY	i u i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	M .		
A LWEAPONS PAYLOAD	A HARMAN	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	MIN	
WEAPONS				
LONGRANGE		CHARLE TENED IN THE THIRD AND A SHARE		
LARGE WARHEAD WARHEAD WAR TO THE STATE OF TH	H	M N		
ANTI-MATERIAL SELLE	THE HIGH L			
SOPHISTICATED (SMART)				
		THE MOTOR PROPERTY.		的结果地區的經濟學的批批的條件

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
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Q Q MO L ON CALL CONUS FORCES
DEPLOYMENT)

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OF AMPHBIOUS	8000-1 15-2 75-7		MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNITH FIGURE 3
COMPARISON	MA		
	TROOPS	AIRCRAFI BOATS GUNFIRE SUPPORT	

A + B = C

A = what now exists?

C = what would I like it to be?

B = what is the difference between A and C?

That is what must be done.

In the case of the NWC:

After I received my assignment as President, had about 5 months before taking over.

A. I sought to answer: "What should one teach at a War College?" What does a mid-career military officer need to improve his effectiveness/productivity? (In other words: what are your objectives?"

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- Gather ideas don't evaluate them immediately
 - must be objective, unbiased
 - must be completely open to all ideas, good and bad
 - must seek out all available counsel. (Good ideas sometimes come from unlikely places)
- Asked a small group of respected educators, industrialists bureaucrats, intellectuals to join me in Washington to discuss what they believed the strengths and weaknesses of the military officer were. (Can also be a means for testing your initial ideas).
 - Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4

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2. Narrowness of view, e.g., Industry-profi

impossible. Vast scope worth covering.

Method of thinking approach.

A-vague idea of approaching mid-career military education: through the three disciplines with which most officers are involved one way or

- strategy
- management

They seemed basic to the needs of 0-4's and above. (The danger here is to become set too quickly.

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At the same time, was examining the extant WC program. В. Must influence the form of any new program which might be decided upon. Some examples of the things I found which disturbed me:

> Review of syllabus showed literally hundreds of subjects covered. Every Navy community was repre-ASW, AAW, subs, Intelligence, Oceanography, Course lacked discernable form. Every year added something due to pressures/vogue of the day. How could you cover so many subjects and hope to have an integrated course?

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*Decision: Reduce subject diversity; teach a few subjects in depth. Leave out. Conscious

• Course was very current events oriented. Today's international picture. If material is current, it must be time sensitive, ergo value to student must be short.

*<u>Decision</u>: Course should be of permanent value to student. Should bring about a fundamental improvement in officer's capability.

Over 170 guest speakers during school year.

Fact: you cannot design a course around a guest speaker over whose lecture content you have no control.

Never know what the course will be from year to year for the Concernstant faculty ments and sold with the learning must be active and content predictable. Must establish high grade in-house capability to teach the course.

• Trips - Student trips (NYC to UN; London to Royal Defense College) were expensive, used up valuable time. How did they enforce what the NWC was trying to teach? Were they really necessary? Could the money/time be better used?

*<u>Decision</u>: Benefits not worth costs. Time too precious. Cut out the trips. Use money for books.

Extra curricula Masters degree program (GWU)

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- they competed for student time

- if needed to prop us NWC program, then NWC not doing job

- Navy had 3X more MS's in International Affairs than it could use. Why make more?

*Decision: End these programs. Strengthen NWC program. Demand more from students.

Decided on course theme: Learn to handle uncertainty.

Basic needs of the 0-4/5:

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• Recognize non-quantifiable, non-rational decision factors, e.g., bureaucracy.

This would represent a permanent change of long range

benefit to the officer.

Risks: (must be weighed for every decision against ex-

Two

pected benefits).

IV.

Not being able to define the new program.

Not being able to find the right people. Could a team be put together which could implement the program?

- Time against us. To throw out old syllabus, needed a new one. Could we be ready for next school year?
- Could new program be sold to "powers"?
- If new program were a flop, could the NWC's reputation survive?
- Could resistence to change be overcome? (alumni, past

Presidents ex-CNO's, retired flag community, etc.)

Helps vs Hindrances:

Admiral Zumwalt gave full support and encouragement to make changes I saw fit - Direct pipeline. VADM Cagle (head of Ed & Training in USN) also full support.

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in time. 15

La Opel

- couldn't get faculty
- couldn't get books/materials
- couldn't get lecturers
- couldn't get printing done
- couldn't mold faculty into team
- Incoming students caught by surprise expected one thing, got another.

VI. Implementing the Plan:

A. Decided if wanted to accomplish major change, had to use Blitzkreig vice gradual methods. Would be absorbed by bureaucracy over period of several months.

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B. Decided necessary to break established hierarchy and put own people in key jobs.

- to get control of program and get it going, appointed 3 academic department heads in whom I had faith. Gradually stripped College directors of assets - this was interim step toward reorganization where academic departments would control faculty assets; Colleges would be admin caretakers of students.

 personally oversaw/approved all conceptual/ mechanical/administrative aspects as they developed.

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Seeking support/fine tuning:

- A. Enlisting support.
 - Active PR program to explain rationale for changes.
 Much criticism based on incomplete or incorrect information.
 - Personal communication with key flag officers
 (active & retired), old NWC supporters, other
 Senior Service School Directors, etc., to explain
 rationale, enlist support.
 - 3. Open door policy to press.



request for comments on utility of the course they received.

Hired outside curriculum evaluator.

Where did resistance to innovation raise its head?

Special interest groups

a) International lawyers

Letters to SecNav

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b) Sub - components of Navy e.g. communications WWMMCS quarter letter

- c) People who see opportunities to indoctrinate
- 2. Alumni Friends of College

Some influential

e.g. GSD attendees

Well placed aides

Some seniors -

3. Retired

Rub off of Z opposition

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And Aloge

4. Faculty

a) downright opposition

Leaks to press

Disturbing to students

- b) pressure for contemporary
- c) pressure for completeness
- 5. Students
 Especially contemporary

Conclusion:

Steps for this change can be isolated

assessed what existed

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Execulty change heretung

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XI. What would I do differently?

 Convocation address (explanation of rationale and program to incoming students) might have been too Possibly could have encouraged less abrasive. resistance to change with a strong yet unabrasive address.

- President's Hours Gripe sessions Do people keep finding things which are wrong; do you keep asking what's wrong? Constant pulse taking.
- Fire some faculty peremptorily
- What would you have done differently?

What elements of the NWC action plan are common to	
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	4
Innovation can take grand	Lin
work garney fun hall	
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Way we make public comparisons shapes attitudes,

eriteria of "other nations"

B. Conventional Forces

Peccuse from an function of the continuous of the continuous